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COMMENT
THE PUNCH THAT LANDED:
THE PROFESSIONAL BOXING SAFETY ACT
OF 1996
I. INTRODUCION
Despite more than two decades of congressional study and pro-
posals, not a single federal law has yet been enacted in this area
[of boxing]. The failure to create a national regulatory agency to
safeguard the physical well-being of professional boxers suggests
that the federal government has not been sufficiently sensitive to
the plight of the members of the small, but nonetheless highly
visible occupation.'
The historical evolution of the sport, including the violence and other
problems of boxing has been well documented.2 Similarly, articles call-
ing for congressional action to cure boxing's ailments have been equally
abundant.'
The sport of boxing, while regulated by the individual states, has
never benefited from federal oversight. With the passage of The Profes-
sional Boxing Safety Act of 1996,4 there is finally a federal statute that
purportedly regulates the health and safety standards of professional
boxing.
This comment is not a historical account that chronicles the establish-
ment of state boxing regulation, or the early attempts at federal regula-
1. Laurence Laufer, Uniform Health and Safety Standards For Professional Boxing: A
Problem in Search of a Federal Solution?, 15 COLuM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 259, 259 (1984).
2. See, e.g., GEORGE C. BERNARD, THE MORAirrY OF PRIZEFIGHTING (1952); BETTY
SPEARS & RICHARD A. SWANSON, HISTORY OF SPORT AND PHYSICAL ACTIvrrY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1978); DON ATYEo, BLOOD & GuIS: VIOLENCE IN SPORTS (1979).
3. See generally Laufer, supra note 1; Ross Rosen, In The Aftermath of McClellan: Isn't It
Time For The Sport of Boxing To Protect Its Participants?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 611
(1995); Kevin M. Walsh, Boxing: Regulating A Health Hazard, 11 J. CoNTEmp. HEALTH L. &
PoL'Y 63 (1994); Ian Forman, Boxing In The LegalArena, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 75 (Spring, 1996);
Peter E. Millspaugh, The Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing: Will Congress Answer
The Bell? 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 33 (1994); Lawrence Bershad & Richard J. Ensor, Boxing
in the United States: Reform, Abolition, or Federal Control? A New Jersey Case Study, 19
SETON HALL L. REv. 865 (1989).
4. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6301-6313 (1996).
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tion. Nor is this comment a diatribe about the violent nature of the sport
that could perhaps provide a moral impetus toward stringent reform or
abolition. Instead, the purpose here is merely to acknowledge the
punch that Congress dealt to an industry previously unfettered by fed-
eral oversight.
Part II explores the ineffective nature of state regulation. Part III
examines the legislative attempts made in the years previous to the Act's
passage including The United States Boxing Commission Act of 1992,
The Professional Boxing Corporation Acts of 1992 and 1993, and The
Boxing Safety, Retirement, and Retraining Act of 1993. Part IV gener-
ally discusses the reasons behind the failure of these attempts. Part V
discusses the proposal of The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994,
and the proposal, passage and reaction to The Professional Boxing
Safety Act of 1996. Part VI analyzes special concerns and potential
problems with the Act. Part VII addresses proposed amendments to the
Act, as well as other boxing reform proposals. Part VIII offers conclud-
ing remarks.
II. STATE REGULATION: INHERENTLY INEFFECTIVE
One of the most frequently made generalized comments by propo-
nents seeking to establish federal regulation of boxing has been the "lack
of 'self-policing' inherent within the industry of professional boxing."5
Indeed, the historical regulation by state authorities or commissions, and
the lack of any strong professional organization,6 has made cohesive
regulation of the sport difficult. Unlike other professional sports where
leagues, players' associations, or some other centralized governing body
provides oversight, boxing has historically allowed individual states to
function on their own.
This has perhaps been facilitated by the structure of the sport itself.
Professional boxing differs from other sports because it has never
needed a central body to arrange a regular schedule, maintain a
specific format, and market its competition successfully. Profes-
sional boxing is a profitable enterprise even though its contests
are not regularly scheduled, the sites for its matches are not inex-
orably fixed by tradition or by homage to the 'home team' con-
cept, and upstart entrepreneurs are not prevented from
speculating and contracting for 'major league' fights, without re-
gard to the 'prerogatives' of the industry's established promoters.
5. Bershad & Ensor, supra note 3, at 906.
6. See id.
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Since professional boxing does not need a central organization
to structure its competition, it lacks a superstructure comparable
to that developed by other sports. Initially, this superstructure
was created to protect the market for these sports' regular for-
mats of competition. Ultimately, however, it evolved to provide
an agency for supervising and safeguarding the players' physical
welfare.
Thus, the very nature of a boxing exhibition has been such that tradition-
ally, it was believed that states could accommodate effective regulation
for bouts occurring within their jurisdiction.
However, professional boxing does not exist along, or within, nicely
drawn borders that delineate the rules and safety procedures that should
govern. While individual states may have created commissions that pro-
mulgate regulations, there is no consistency, no minimal requirements
that set the floor for acceptable policies and procedures. Such frag-
mented governing amongst the states has been particularly ineffective
because professional boxing occurs on interstate, national, even interna-
tional levels.
This high degree of variation of boxing regulation among the states
has created economic incentives discouraging federal oversight, and the
establishment of minimum standards. For example,
[t]he income generated by commercial, subscription, and closed
circuit television coverage has minimized the importance of gate
receipts to a financially successful match. Promoters, therefore,
may maximize profits and minimize government intervention by
staging fights in states with more relaxed regulations, even if
ticket sales are likely to be lower there. Thus states which offer
the boxer the greatest medical safeguards may well have the few-
est boxers to protect. States with little regulation, and perhaps
few fans, will attract an increased share of the boxing business.
The mobility of the boxing industry renders it immune from effec-
tive state regulation, making it virtually impossible to safeguard
the welfare of the fighters as well as the viewing interests of the
consuming public.'
In short, state regulation as the sole scheme for governing the sport
has potentially encouraged abuse by opportunists and other unscrupu-
lous individuals. In addition to the economic issue previously men-
tioned, the health and safety of the boxers themselves are
7. Laufer, supra note 1, at 290.
8. Id. at 279.
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compromised.9 For example, if a boxer has been suspended or otherwise
disqualified in one state, there was previously nothing that prevented
him or her from fighting elsewhere. If boxing is that individual's liveli-
hood, and because success and rankings in the sport are determined by
win-loss records (which can obviously only be determined if one contin-
ues to box), there is an inclination to participate elsewhere. This had
occurred regardless of whether it was in the best interest of the boxer or
his or her opponent.
III. BOXING REGULATION: ATrEmprs IN THE 1990s
Although the United States Congress has proposed legislation nearly
every session since the early 1960s,' 0 a brief overview of the proposals
made just prior to the passage of The Professional Boxing Safety Act is
helpful in laying the foundation for what would eventually be enacted
into law.
A. The United States Boxing Commission Act of 1992
On June 16, 1992, Congressman William Richardson of New Mexico
introduced The United States Boxing Commission Act of 1992." Its
most substantive feature called for the creation of a Boxing Commission
which was to be a self-funded arm of the federal Department of Labor.'2
This Commission was to establish minimum industry standards, 13 and
create a national computer database containing the registration of each
individual boxer.' 4 Of primary concern was the standardization of
health and safety issues.15 In particular, the legislation sought to regu-
late physical and mental examinations, the use of boxing equipment, and
the availability of medical services at the match. 6 Additionally, the bill
addressed the concern of conflicts of interest, and prevention of such
conflicts among managers, promoters, and boxers. 17
9. See id.
10. For a thorough examination of the evolution of boxing regulation in the historical
perspective, see Millspaugh, supra note 3.
11. H. R. 5407, 102d Cong. (1992).
12. See id. at § 2.
13. See id. at § 5.
14. See id. at § 8(c).
15. See id. at § 5(a)(1).
16. See H.R. 5407, 102d Cong. § 5(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1992).
17. See id at § 5(a)(2).
[Vol. 9:191
THE PUNCH THAT LANDED
Another feature of the bill was defining the relationship between the
federal Commission and state authorities.' 8 The proposal mandated that
state boxing authorities were to act as registering agencies, 9 and pro-
hibited matches from taking place in a state where no regulatory agency
existed, unless the state provided the Commission with a detailed, com-
prehensive plan for boxing regulation. 0
The bill proposed that once minimum standards were set by the fed-
eral Commission, state agencies would be required to submit plans that
met these minimum standards.2 ' Failing to initially meet these stan-
dards, or later not maintaining such standards, would result in disap-
proval, or withdrawal of prior approval by the Commission.22
Finally, the bill recommended government funding for the first five
years of operation in the amount of approximately $1.5 million.' After
that, the proposal suggested that the Commission be funded by fees gen-
erated from the federal registration system. 4
This bill was sent to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, as
well as the House Education and Labor Committee on the date of intro-
duction, and was never acted upon.25
B. The Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1992
To compete with Congressman Richardson's proposal in the House,
Senator William Roth of Delaware introduced The Professional Boxing
Corporation Act of 199226 in the Senate. Its companion, sponsored by
Congressman Owens, was introduced in the House in early July, approx-
imately fifteen days later.27
This bill initially set out findings which concluded that: (1) profes-
sional boxing was besieged by problems that state regulation was ill-
equipped to control; (2) there was no uniform regulation of professional
boxing; (3) unlike other professional sports, boxing remained centrally
unregulated, and was incapable of self-regulation; (4) the major
problems in professional boxing centered around the exploitation of
18. See id. at § 6(b).
19. See id. at § 6(b)(2).
20. See id. at § 7(a)(1)-(2).
21. See H.R. 5407, 102d Cong. § 6(a)-(b) (1992).
22. See id. at § 6(c)-(d).
23. See id. at § 13(a).
24. See id.
25. See 102 Bill Tracking H.R. 5407, last action date was July 8, 1992.
26. S. 2852, 102d Cong. (1992).
27. H. R. 5524, 102d Cong. (1992).
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boxers, conflicts of interest, corruption, and questionable judging; and
(5) the problems in boxing not only endangered the health and welfare
of participants, but undermined the credibility of the sport.28
According to Roth's proposal, the solution to the woes in boxing was
to be found in the creation of an oversight organization known as the
Professional Boxing Corporation, or PBC. The stated purpose of the
Act was "to establish a national organization which shall work with state
boxing authorities to establish and enforce uniform rules and regulations
for professional boxing in order to protect the health and safety of box-
ers and to ensure fairness in the sport." 9
The essential functions of the PBC were threefold. First, the PBC
was to establish a nationwide computer database,30 similar to that of
Richardson's proposal. Second, the PBC was to license, in a nationwide
fashion, boxers, referees, and judges who would be charged with enforc-
ing industry-wide minimum standards." Finally, the PBC was to imple-
ment a national certification process to register promoters, managers,
trainers, and others involved in the sport.3
To these primary functions, the PBC was assigned additional tasks as
well. These included enacting regulations to require fight contracts to be
filed and reviewed by the PBC thirty days prior to the match,33 enacting
regulations establishing standards for contractual agreements between
boxers and promoters,34 and enacting regulations setting minimum stan-
dards for physical and mental exams, equipment, and the availability of
medical services at matches.35
In order to aid the PBC, Roth gave some teeth to his proposal by
granting the PBC a series of enforcement options. Included in these
powers was the ability to suspend or revoke registrations and licenses,
conduct investigations, hold hearings, and issue prohibitory orders. 6 In
carrying out investigations, PBC administrators were further given au-
thority to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses and evidence, and com-
pel testimony under penalty of fines or imprisonment. 7
28. See S. 2852, 102d Cong. § 2 (1992).
29. Id. at § 3.
30. See id. at § 8(a)(1).
31. See id. at § 8(a)(2).
32. See id. at § 8(a)(3).
33. See S. 2852, 102d Cong. § 8(c)(1)-(2) (1992).
34. See id. at § 8(c)(9)-(10).
35. See id. at § 8(c)(3)-(6).
36. See id. at § 8(d)-(g).
37. See id. at § 8(f)(2)-(3).
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Similar to the Richardson bill, The Professional Boxing Corporation
Act of 1992 entered various committees in both the House and the Sen-
ate shortly after introduction, and was never acted upon.38
C. The Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993
The competing, yet complementary bills introduced by the 102d Con-
gress championed the same goals: the long term regulation of profes-
sional boxing through federal agencies designed to establish,
promulgate, and encourage industry standards in a uniform way. In the
summer of 1993, an amalgam of the two proposals emerged in The Pro-
fessional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993,39 sponsored by Senator Roth
and Congressman Richardson.
This new piece of legislation retained the major elements of Roth's
previous bill, and added the state approval requirements of Richardson's
bill. However, to supplement what was essentially the melding of two
previous plans, the new proposal gave the PBC expanded authority to
require an event license for major boxing matches,40 to set minimum
standards for the fairness of boxing contracts and agreements, 41 and to
determine specific standards for state and federal sanctioning organiza-
tions.42 Additionally, the new plan encouraged the PBC to examine the
creation of an accident, health, and life insurance fund for boxers, 43 and
to study the feasibility of a pension program for professional boxers.44
In terms of enforcement, all of the powers proposed in the Roth bill
were retained. However, one potentially significant power was added
which authorized the PBC the right to intervene "in any civil action filed
in a United States District Court on behalf of the public interest in any
case relating to professional boxing."'45
Similar to its predecessors, this proposal was never acted upon in
committee.46
38. See 102 Bill Tracking S. 2852, last action date was Aug. 11, 1992; 102 Bill Tracking H.
R. 5524, last action date was July 1, 1992.
39. H. R. 2607, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1189, 103d Cong. (1993).
40. See id at § 8(b)(3). The bills are identical and section numbers apply to both.
41. See id at § 8(d)(9).
42. See id. at § 8(d)(10).
43. See id at § 8(d)(5)(A).
44. See H.R. 2607, 103d Cong.; S. 1189, 103d Cong. § 8(d)(5)(B) (1993).
45. Id. at § 8(i).
46. See 103 Bill Tracking H.R. 2607, last action date was July 26, 1993; 103 Bill Tracking S.
1189, last action date was July 1, 1993.
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D. The Boxing Safety, Retirement, and Retraining Act of 1993
Much like the previous boxing proposals, The Boxing Safety, Retire-
ment, and Retraining Act of 1993,47 sought to establish a Professional
Boxing Corporation. However, this plan (introduced by Congressman
Owens) went further in that it suggested the creation of a Professional
Boxing Advisory Board, or PBAB, which would convene and make rec-
ommendations to the PBC on how to efficiently and effectively carry out
the functions of the legislation.48 Additionally, the PBAB would be
charged with contacting each state boxing authority to encourage the
establishment of a Congress of State Boxing Administrators which
would then meet annually to review and revise the rules of the sport, the
health and safety regulations of professional boxers, and the licensing
and registration of participants.4 9
In short, the only significant difference between this plan and the
Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993 was the establishment of a
sub-administration, the PBAB, to direct and advise the PBC. All other
provisions remained essentially similar, including the fact that neither
left committee.5 0
IV. FAILED A-rEMrs
It has been suggested that the hesitancy of Congress to pass legisla-
tion regulating boxing can be attributed to the lack of urgency for sub-
stantial guidance in the sport, and the inadequate means of
understanding and evaluating whether any legislation would be a suc-
cessful effort toward reform.5 Indeed, one author notes:
At work also is certainly an apprehension that federal interven-
tion into professional boxing would open the door for the regula-
tion of other professional sports from Washington. Many
observers still contend, simply, that a combination of market
forces and public opinion alone will either discipline the industry
or bring about its demise.52
There is also the possibility that the proposals introduced, and sug-
gested may have gone too far. It has been observed that, "[t]heir unmis-
takable signature is the position they stake-out on the heavy-handed end
47. H. R. 3311, 103d Cong. (1993).
48. See id. at § 7(a)-(b).
49. See id. at § 7(b).
50. See 103 Bill Tracking H. R. 3311, last action date was July 26, 1994.
51. Millspaugh, supra note 3, at 67-68.
52. Id. at 68.
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of the regulatory spectrum. A new national standard-setting, rule-mak-
ing entity is inevitably involved. This entity is to be superimposed over
existing state and local authorities." 3 Further, none of the legislative
proposals have defined what the "minimum standards," or "rules and
regulations" would comprise. An administrative commission, or corpo-
ration is merely being created to make those determinations. Resistance
toward creating and granting authority to a rule-making body armed
only with broad-based, generalized guidance, to a certain extent, may be
the hallmark of legislative caution. Thus far, it is only certain from the
offered proposals, that a federal commission would be established,
charged with setting minimum standards regulating the health and wel-
fare of boxers. Perhaps without more elucidation as to the kind of mini-
mum standards required, the fate of these legislative proposals was
predetermined.
Nonetheless, while the failed legislative attempts to regulate boxing
continued to mount, the accusations against the sport remained con-
stant.5 4 Included in the laundry list of charges was the exploitation of
boxers; fixed contests and mismatches; inadequate health and safety pro-
tections for participants; conflicts of interest among managers and pro-
moters; monopolization of the market; the influence of organized crime;
and inadequate state regulations.55 In this climate of accelerating accu-
sations and congressional failures, another legislative attempt was made.
V. THEr PROFESSIONAL BOXING SAFETY Acr: 1994 AND 1996
A. The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994: An Early Version
In 1994, Senators McCain and Bryan submitted a proposal entitled
The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994.56 It was designed to pro-
vide safety regulations for journeymen boxers. Substantively, the propo-
sal had four major sections.
First, the bill proposed a registration system whereby each individual
boxer would be required to register with a state boxing commission.57
Each state commission would then issue an identification card contain-
ing a personal identification number and a photograph of the boxer5s
The boxer would then be compelled to present this card prior to the
53. Id.
54. See generally Walsh, supra note 3; Rosen, supra note 3.
55. See Millspaugh, supra note 3, at 67.
56. S. 1991, 103d Cong. (1994).
57. See id. at § 5(a).
58. See id. at § 5(b).
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weigh in of any given match. According to Senator McCain, such a sys-
tem would "help State officials verify not only the identity, but the pro-
fessional and medical history of each boxer seeking to box in the State.
Verifying this information [would] enable[ ] State boxing commissioners
to ensure that no injured or debilitated boxers [would] be exploited by
participating in a show in their State."5 9
Second, the bill mandated that in order for any state to hold a profes-
sional boxing match, it must be regulated by an oversight committee
such as a state boxing commission.60 If a state failed to have such a regu-
latory authority, then they would be compelled to arrange sanctioning of
the event by another state boxing commission.61 Senator McCain noted
that "[i]t is dangerous and indefensible for any jurisdiction to allow pro-
fessional boxing matches to occur without providing a minimum level of
responsible oversight. '62
Third, the bill required that each State boxing commission review the
professional and medical background of each boxer wishing to fight, in
order to determine whether the boxer had been suspended elsewhere.63
This provision was designed to prevent boxers from fighting in one state,
when they had previously been suspended for failing drug tests, or were
otherwise deemed medically ineligible to compete in another state.
Finally, McCain's proposal required that suspensions and results of
boxing matches be reported to the Association of State Boxing Commis-
sioners and the Florida State Athletic Commission.6' Senator McCain
noted that,
[t]he requirement for the State of Florida's commission to also be
notified of boxing show results and suspensions will assist their
officials in the extremely valuable work they have generously per-
formed in this regard for several years. At no cost to other State
commissions or other interested parties, Florida's boxing officials
send out a continuously updated list of all boxers and promoters
who have been suspended across the country due to injury, viola-
tion of state laws, or improper conduct. All State commissions
should review this list weekly, and take action to properly oversee
the boxing events held in their State.65
59. 140 Cong. Rec. S 3961 (daily ed. March 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. McCain).
60. See S. 1991, 103d Cong. § 4 (1994).
61. See id.
62. 140 Cong. Rec. S. 3961 (daily ed. March 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. McCain).
63. See S. 1991, 103d Cong. § 6 (1994).
64. See id. at § 7.
65. 140 Cong. Rec. S. 3961 (daily ed. March 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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In his testimony introducing the bill, Senator McCain addressed
some of the reasons why this proposal should be considered, especially
in light of previously failed attempts. He expressly pointed out the omis-
sion of creating a federal commission that would require taxpayer fund-
ing.66 Additionally, he acknowledged that maintaining state regulation
of the sport was still a primary concern; his federal legislation would
merely provide some minimal standards for boxing oversight. 67 Finally,
McCain addressed the historical practice of exploitation in boxing which
seriously damaged its integrity.68 In doing so, he was critical of congres-
sional inaction, noting that "we simply cannot tolerate the dangerous
status quo of bootleg boxing shows and fraudulent matches because
things have always been done that way, or because the Congress has
never found a practical and acceptable method to assist the State com-
missions that regulate the sport."69
On March 25, 1994, the bill was referred to the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee. It received favorable recom-
mendations in committee, but was never acted upon.7 °
B. The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996: The New Law
The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 199671 (the "Act"), is quite
short and retains few vestiges of previous legislative proposals, although
it most closely resembles its predecessor, The Professional Boxing Safety
Act of 1994. It maintains as its purpose, "to improve and expand the
system of safety precautions that protects the welfare of professional
boxers; and to assist State boxing commissions to provide proper over-
sight for the professional boxing industry in the United States. '72 To
achieve those ends, it prohibits professional boxing matches in states
without boxing commissions, "unless the match is supervised by a boxing
commission from another State.. .. "I
Additionally, the Act mandates adherence to an explicit list of safety
standards. First, a physical examination of each participant, by a certi-
fied physician, stating whether the boxer is physically able to safely com-
pete, must be performed. The commission must receive a copy of the
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See 103 Bill Tracking S. 1991, last action date was September 28, 1994.
71. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6301-6313 (1996).
72. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6302 (1996).
73. Id. at § 6303.
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physical exam, and the physician's recommendation.74 Second, an am-
bulance and medical personnel must be continuously present at the
match.75 Third, a physician must be continuously present at the match.76
And finally, each boxer is required to carry health insurance to provide
medical coverage for an injury which may be sustained during the
match.77
To combat the allegations of "state hopping, ' 7  and fight mis-
matches, the statute establishes a registration system.79 Each boxer is
required to register with the boxing commission in his or her state of
domicile, or in any state with a boxing commission. The commission
then issues an identification card containing a photograph of the boxer,
his or her social security number (or similar citizen identification
number), and a personal identification number assigned by a boxing reg-
istry (i.e. a boxing commission).80 This registration must be renewed
every two years,8' and must be presented to the appropriate commission
no later than the time of weigh-in for a particular contest.82
Rather than creating a federal commission for oversight purposes as
most previous plans had done, the Act holds state commissions responsi-
ble for carrying out the regulation of the sport. First, the commission
must establish procedures for evaluating the records, and physician certi-
fications of each boxer who wishes to fight in that state.8 3 More signifi-
cantly, the commission must ensure that no boxer participates in a match
while suspended from any commission due to a recent knockout or se-
ries of losses, an injury or denial of physician certification, failure of a
drug test, using false aliases, or falsifying identification cards or support-
ing documentation. 4 Furthermore, the commission must establish pro-
cedures to review suspensions and revoke suspensions when they are no
longer merited by the facts.85 Finally, each commission is charged with
74. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6304(1) (1996).
75. See id. at (2).
76. See id. at (3).
77. See id. at (4).
78. This is the term given to the practice of fighting under an assumed name in one state,
after being disqualified and/or suspended from fighting in another.
79. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6305 (1996).
80. See id. at (b)(1).
81. See id. at (b)(2).
82. See id. at (b)(3).
83. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6306 (a)(1) (1996).
84. See id. at (a)(2).
85. See id. at (a)(3)-(4).
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making a reporting to other registries, those entities certified to maintain
records and identifications of boxers.8 6
In addressing the problems of conflicts of interest, the Act provides
that:
No member or employee of a boxing commission, no person who
administers or enforces State boxing laws, and no member of the
Association of Boxing Commissions may belong to, contract with,
or receive any compensation from, any person who sanctions, ar-
ranges, or promotes professional boxing matches or who other-
wise has a financial interest in an active boxer currently registered
with a boxing registry.87
Another significant aspect of the Act is the enforcement provision.
The U. S. Attorney General may bring civil action for injunctive relief if
there is reasonable cause to believe there is a violation of the Act.88
Criminal penalties of imprisonment and/or fines up to $20,000.00 may be
levied against managers, promoters, and matchmakers for any violations
of the Act. 9 Similar fines and penalties are available for any infringe-
ment of the conflict of interests provisions.9° Any boxer who knowingly
violates the Act may be fined up to $1,000.00. 91
Finally, the statute addresses its relationship with state law by noting
that, "[n]othing in this Act shall prohibit a State from adopting or en-
forcing supplemental or more stringent laws or regulations not inconsis-
tent with this Act, or criminal, civil, or administrative fines for violations
of such laws or regulations. ' '9 2
In sum, the essential features of the Act are threefold. First, the Act
mandates that all professional boxing matches be sanctioned by a state
boxing commission. If a particular state does not have such a commis-
sion, it must adopt the rules and regulations of a state that does. Second,
the Act requires that all boxers register with a state boxing commission
and maintain renewable identification cards. And finally, the Act de-
mands that all boxers who enter the ring be deemed physically able to
fight, that all boxers carry adequate health insurance in the event of an
emergency, and that all professional boxing contests be held in the pres-
ence of a physician, medical personnel, and an ambulance service.
86. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6307 (1996).
87. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6308 (1996).
88. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6309 (a) (1996).
89. See id. at § (b)(1).
90. See id. at § (b)(2).
91. See id. at § (b)(3).
92. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6313 (1996).
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C. A Good First Step
Senator Richard Bryan of Nevada helped draft the Act, and drew
from Nevada's comprehensive regulatory structure of professional box-
ing oversight.93 Senator Bryan noted that:
[I]t was our intent in developing this legislation that the States
retain primacy in implementing health and safety requirements
for the boxing industry. The Professional Boxing Safety Act is
not an attempt to create a new, costly federal bureaucracy to
oversee the boxing industry. To the contrary, this legislation is
supported by the Association of Boxing Commissions. In addi-
tion..., enacting S.187 would have no significant impact on the
federal budget.94
Senator Bryan hints at two reasons why this Act eventually passed
where others had not. First, it did not require federal funding. Second,
and more significantly, it did not create a federal commission that could
be construed as essentially regulating the sport from Washington, a fear
previously suggested.95 Similarly, Congressman Oxley championed en-
actment and further reform, but cautioned, "[h]owever, we need to en-
sure that any reforms do not weigh down the bill and prevent passage.,
96
Thus what emerged was a modest scheme that left state authority
intact, while offering explicit minimum safety standards. In response to
some criticism that the Act was just a diluted, watered-down version of
previous proposals, one commentator noted that, "[i]t is a subset of the
Roth bill. But Sen[ator] McCain [the Act's primary sponsor] feels that
it's a good first step." 97
D. Reaction
The news of the Act's proposal and eventual passage was met with
mixed reviews. The Act was called "toothless,"9 and although there
93. See The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996: Testimony on S. 187 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Comm., and
the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the House Economic and Educational Opportuni-
ties Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Richard H. Bryan).
94. Id.
95. See Millspaugh, supra note 3, at 68.
96. The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996: Testimony on H. R. 1186 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Comm., 104th
Cong. (1996) (statement of Congressman Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials).
97. Punch-Drunk: Reform Slow In Coming In U.S., HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 18, 1996,
at 10.
98. Id.
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was some faint applause for congressional action toward the regulation
of professional boxing, many commentators seemed to think that
although it was something, the Act was not much.99 The loudest criti-
cism seemed to come from editorials in the sports pages, or journalists
who chastised Congress for failing "to regulate the disjointed and cor-
ruption-prone sport."'100
However, most of the reaction toward the Act was of a positive, if
not understanding, nature. Those in this camp seemed to accept the Act
as a foundation upon which to build future reform. In that sense, it was
viewed as a critical first step toward better, and more comprehensive
oversight. For example, one commentator noted that:
The bill isn't designed as a cure-all for professional boxing but it
focuses on safety and assisting states that don't have boxing com-
missions.... The bill isn't aimed at major boxing states such as
Nevada, California, New York and New Jersey, but toward states
that have occasional cards. Sometimes in such states there is no
commission or a commission that isn't used to regulating a card.
In those cases, commissions sometimes don't have the experience
or expertise to properly regulate cards. Such commissions need
all the help they can get.1 1
VI. SPECIAL CONCERNS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Although the Act has at times been criticized for being too moderate
and for not going far enough toward reform and regulation, there are at
least three areas in which potential legal challenges may arise. These
include: fights on Indian reservations, the issue of state sovereignty, and
HIV-positive boxers. Each will be addressed in turn.
A. Indian Reservations
One potential loophole in the Act is the regulation on Indian reser-
vations, considered sovereign nations.'0 2 Reservation gaming ordi-
nances which allow casino gambling have begun to open their doors to
boxing, and increasingly, more professional bouts are occurring in these
99. See Jurisprudence, L. A. Tnims, June 12, 1996, at C8; Boxing Bill Lacks Punch, Critics
Believe, CoMMERcuAL APPEAL, June 12, 1996, at D2.
100. Jurisprudence, supra note 99 at C8.
101. Royce Feour, Legislation Could Do Wonders In Improving Safety In Boxing, LAS
VEGAS REvmw-JouRAL, June 28, 1996, at 4C.
102. See Norm Frauenheim, Bill 'First Step' To Knocking Out Mismatches, ARIz. REPUB-
LIC, Oct. 2, 1996, at D2.
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venues. 10 3 The Act prepared for this event by devoting a whole section
to professional boxing matches conducted on Indian reservations." 4
The general requirement permits the tribal organization to regulate
matches held on the reservation, or permits contractual agreement with
a boxing commission to carry out that regulation. 5 If the tribal organi-
zation does not have, or fails to establish an agency equivalent to a box-
ing commission, it is required to adopt the standards and guidelines of
the boxing commission of the state in which the reservation is located. 0 6
If a recent Oregon example is any indication, there may be a mutual
concern both from reservations and the states in which they are located,
to adhere to the Act's standards. In Oregon, the State Boxing and Wres-
tling Commission worked closely with the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua
Indians to reach an agreement with tribal rules and regulations modeled
after the state's boxing regulations.'0 7 The result cleared the way for the
first professional boxing match on an Oregon reservation, and the first
professional contest in Oregon in three years.'08
Although it has not occurred, it is conceivable that a reservation may
want to go ahead with a match involving a boxer suspended else-
where.10 9 This would surely raise a legal challenge to the Act's
provision.
B. State Sovereignty
Closely related to the potential concern on Indian reservations is the
sovereignty of those handful of states without boxing commissions." 0
The state of Colorado has spoken the loudest about this issue. Their
concern is the provision of the Act that requires a state without a boxing
commission to contract with a state that does have a commission, and
use those standards and procedures in order to sponsor a professional
103. See id.
104. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 6312 (1996).
105. See id. at (b)(1)(A)-(B).
106. See id. at (b)(2).
107. See Agreement Brings Boxing Matches to Oregon Casino, COLUMBIAN, Oct. 14, 1997,
at B.
108. See id.
109. See Frauenheim, supra note 102, at D2.
110. At the time of the Act's passage, only Colorado, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming were without state boxing commissions.
Kansas left such supervision to local oversight. Today, the only remaining states without state
boxing commissions are Colorado, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Oklahoma, Oregon, and
North Carolina created state regulatory commissions shortly after the passage of the Act. The
Kansas law has been left unchanged.
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boxing match."' According to some, this smacks of federal interference
upon a state, clearly violating the 10th Amendment."'
However, this question of whether the federal government can con-
stitutionally "encroach" on an area previously regulated solely by the
states, has already been addressed by the United States Supreme
Court." 3 A 1955 decision, United States v. International Boxing Club of
New York," 4 explored whether boxing held an antitrust exemption simi-
lar to that of baseball. The defendants attempted to establish that box-
ing was a "local affair," and thus not an industry engaged in interstate
commerce (and hence could not be held in violation of antitrust laws for
restraints on interstate commerce)." The Court disagreed and found
the federal antitrust laws applicable." 6 Even though the matches were
indeed of a "local" nature, the fact that they were promoted, televised,
and broadcast on a multistate level made them amenable to federal
law.117
One author notes,
[t]he Court did not address the question of whether promoting a
local, non-televised, 'club fight' was also a 'business engaged in
interstate commerce,' and whether, as such, it was subject to fed-
eral regulation as well. If it is not, federal uniform health and
safety standards would not affect many of the matches conducted
under circumstances most dangerous to a boxer's health and
safety. It is at least arguable, however, that federal regulation is
not unconstitutional where contestants, promoters, spectators and
advertisers utilize the channels of interstate and foreign com-
merce in order to engage in, hold, attend or present a boxing
match.""
Furthermore, because advancement in boxing is based on rankings,
affected by a win-loss record, every fight, whether highly promoted, tele-
vised or not, has the potential to significantly impact a boxer's rank-
ing." 9 Thus to increase his or her professional standing, a boxer is likely
to travel, interstate, to expand his or her opportunities to fight.'2 0 Addi-
111. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6303(1996).
112. See Jerry Kopel & Dave Kopel, Congress Sucker Punches Colorado, RocKY MoUN-
TAIN NEWS, Jan. 10, 1997, at 48A.
113. See Laufer, supra note 1, at 280.
114. 348 U. S. 236 (1955).
115. See id. at 241.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Laufer, supra note 1, at 281.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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tionally, "the frequent use of interstate commerce to circumvent many
states' regulatory schemes is persuasive evidence that the inadequacy of
current health safeguards in professional boxing at all levels of competi-
tion is a problem of national scope."''
Although the Act was designed specifically to address the concerns
of journeymen boxers (as opposed to the highly promoted televised
bouts), Laufer's argument is compelling. These smaller, "localized"
fights are necessary to buttress a boxer's standing and rank. To the ex-
tent that a boxer has been allowed to "shop around" for fights-whether
prompted by suspensions, loss of eligibility, or trying to find an "easy"
win-then a credible argument can be made that such a practice does
reach the level of interstate commerce.
Whether a court would agree is purely an exercise in speculation,
however, "[flederal intervention to protect the health and safety of play-
ers in sports with inadequate private regulation is not unprece-
dented."'22 President Theodore Roosevelt, disturbed by the brutality in
collegiate football, began a reform movement in 1905 to create uniform-
ity in rules; establish a broader range of penalties; and otherwise alter
the sport to reduce the rates of injury and death.'" Roosevelt's initia-
tive was very successful, so much so that "[m]any of the major features
of today's football had their origins in the rules developed in 1906. ' I24
Nevertheless, Colorado, which does not have a boxing commission at
this juncture, is questioning the legality of its submission to "supervi-
sion" by another state. Their major contention is that if they had wanted
to create a state boxing commission, they would have; and "[i]f Congress
wanted to spend the money and hire the employees to create a Federal
Boxing Commission, which would regulate boxing nationwide, there
would be no claim that the law violates states' rights."'1
While the issue may be moot (there is a bill pending in the Colorado
legislature which creates a boxing commission), it raises another poten-
tial challenge to the Act. Defining the legality of regulation in one state
by another, may require a court determination. A group in Colorado is
suggesting that the Colorado Attorney General bring a lawsuit to pre-
vent the laws of another state from being forced upon its own
sovereignty.126
121. Id.
122. Id. at 266.
123. See Laufer, supra note 1, at 266-67.
124. Id. at 267.
125. Kopel & Kopel, supra note 112, at 48A.
126. See id.
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Incidentally, there have been numerous tales of problems with Colo-
rado fight cards. 27 In describing the Colorado situation, Woody Kislow-
ski, a former fighter and member of the Colorado Boxing Alliance,
commented:
Ricardo Galvan, still under suspension from being knocked out in
Fort Collins in December, was impersonating Ricky Corona..
.[ilt was pointed out that Corona was actually Galvan and that he
was under suspension [but] ... my friend was told, 'Hey, what are
you, some kind of troublemaker?' . . . This circus sideshow fea-
tured suspended fighters, impostors, boxers outweighed by 60 to
70 pounds, officials that worked corners for the fighters in one
fight, then officiated the next.., and of course [there was] our old
friend the mismatch.'"
This is precisely the type of situation the Act is designed to eradicate.
C. HIV-Positive Boxers
A final legal issue that could rear its head with the passage of the
Act, is the concern surrounding HIV-positive boxers.' 2 9 Most commis-
sions require mandatory AIDS testing prior to boxing contests. In the
most notorious boxing example, heavyweight Tommy Morrison tested
positive for the HIV virus in February 1996, and received a medical sus-
pension from the state of Nevada. 3 ° Under the provisions of the new
Act, other states are compelled to honor that suspension.
The transmission of the HIV virus is of special concern in boxing
where bloody exchanges are commonplace. Middleweight boxer Tony
Thornton offered testimony prior to the passage of the Act and focused
on the HIV issue. He raised a legitimate question by stating, "[f]ighters
train on a daily basis at gyms -with whomever is available. Are sparring
partners going to be tested for HIV?''1 He was speaking generally
about the conditions affecting the health and safety of fighters, and im-
plied that the Act did not do enough if the genuine concern is for the
127. See Dan Luzadder, Boxing Regulation On House Agenda, RocKY MoUtA rJ NEWs,
Jan. 25, 1997, at 5A.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Paul M. Anderson, Comment, Cautious Defense: Should I Be Afraid To
Guard You? (Mandatory AIDS Testing In Professional Team Sports), 5 MARQ. SPoRTs L. J.
281 (1995) (explaining the issue of HIV-positive athletes and AIDS testing in the sports
arena).
130. See Frauenheim, supra note 102, at D2.
131. The Professional Boxing Safety Act: Testimony on S. 187 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Comm. and the Sub-
comm. on Workplace Protections of the House Economic and Educational Opportunities
Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Tony Thornton).
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boxer's welfare. The Act does not regulate amateur contests, or the day-
to-day conditions of professional boxers. HIV transmission is just as
likely to occur in these scenarios as during a professional bout.
Interestingly, Tommy Morrison wanted to sponsor a boxing match to
raise funds for children with AIDS.132 The match was to take place in
Tokyo, Japan, where Japanese law does not prohibit HIV-positive boxers
from entering the ring.133 His original opponent, Anthony Cooks, was
forced out of participation when he was arrested on warrants for rape,
and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. 34
Morrison instead fought Marcus Rhode who lost the bout to Morri-
son when the referee stopped the scheduled ten round bout one minute
and thirty-eight seconds into the first round after Morrison downed
Rhode three times.' 35 In commenting about the concerns of fighting an
HIV-positive boxer, fight promoter Ron Weathers said, "I have fifty
fighters who want to fight Tommy Morrison. He's a credible fighter. If
they knock him out, it's instant money. With the business they are in,
these fighters are not concerned with HIV. In this sport, they put them-
selves on the line every day.' 136
If Weathers' statements are true, there is perhaps an even more com-
pelling argument in favor of more stringent regulation. If boxers, pro-
moters, and managers are willing to disregard potential health risks, such
as HIV transmission, in the hope of obtaining quick cash, they may likely
forego necessary precautions. As such precautions are mandated, rather
than optional, the chances of boxers putting themselves and others at
risk is reduced. However, as these precautions only apply to the testing
and reporting procedures in a professional bout, legal issues in the train-
ing and amateur realm may still exist.
VII. AMENDMENTS AND OTHER PROPOSALS
Two amendments to the Act have been proposed, one in the House,
and one in the Senate. The first, 3 7 authored by Senator McCain, seeks
132. See HIV-Positive Boxer Tommy Morrison Wants to Fight Again, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESS, Sept. 20, 1996; Feedback, REcoRD-NoRTmHER N. J., Sept. 29, 1996, at S3.
133. See Steve Springer, Morrison Foe Is A Fugitive, Boxing: Anthony Cooks Wanted For
Rape and Drug Charges, L. A. TimES, Oct. 30, 1996, at C1.
134, See id.
135. See Steve Springer & Sonni Efron, HIV & Sports: What Have We Learnedl L. A.
TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1996, at C9.
136. Id.
137. See S. 1506, 105th Cong. (1997).
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to add a section protecting boxers from exploitation. The general provi-
sion states that no licensee, promoter, manager, or matchmaker:
[M]ay require a boxer to employ, retain, or provide compensation
to any individual or business enterprise (whether operating in
corporate form or not) designated by that person as a condition
of:
(1) such person's working with the boxer as licensee, manager,
matchmaker, or promoter;
(2) such person's arranging for the boxer to participate in a
professional boxing match; or
(3) such boxer's participation in a professional boxing
match.138
This amendment passed the Senate in November of 1997, and was intro-
duced to the House Committees on Education and the Workplace, and
Commerce. 39
The second amendment, 4 ° probably introduced in light of Mike Ty-
son's ear biting of Evander Holyfield, adds a new term to the definition
section of the Act for "malicious foul or infraction," and defines such
activity as:
[A]ny violent act or series of violent acts in which a professional
boxer intentionally causes, or attempts to cause, bodily injury to
an opposing boxer during the course of a professional boxing
match in a manner inconsistent with the generally accepted meth-
ods of competition in a boxing match, as determined by guide-
lines set forth by the Association of State Boxing Commissions
... includ[ing] (a) head butting, (b) kicking, (c) striking an oppo-
nent after a round has ended, (d) biting an opponent's body or
extremities, [and] (e) striking an opponent on an impermissible
part of the opponent's body.14
This amendment further deems such malicious fouls or infractions as
permissible reasons for suspension by any State boxing commission. 42
And thus, under previous provisions of the the Act, the boxer would
essentially be prohibited from boxing anywhere while under suspension.
Most recently, this amendment was pending in two House
Committees. 43
138. Id. at § 15 (a)(1)-(3).
139. See 105 Bill Tracking S. 1506, last action date was Nov. 12, 1997.
140. See H. R. 2354, 105th Cong. (1997).
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See 105 Bill Tracking H. R. 2354, last action date was Aug. 1, 1997.
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Senator McCain has long implied that the Act was just the first stage
in a series of changes that he would like to see implemented. In addition
to the two proposed amendments, McCain recently began exploring the
possibility of a pension plan for retired professional boxers. He recently
noted that, "We've got to do this in stages... The first effort was to see
what we could do to protect the health and safety of fighters. Boxing is
the only major sport where there is no pension plan. These people are
the least able to adjust to the post-fight situation."' 44
The feasibility and operation of a pension fund are somewhat un-
clear, 145 but McCain remains dedicated in his fight to protect journey-
men boxers, and "to care for those who bear the scars of this demanding
profession.' '1 46
The success of such a proposal is hard to predict especially in light of
the newness of the Act, and the thirty-odd years required to get any
legislative action passed. Nonetheless, it is likely that McCain and
others will continue to keep opportunities for boxing reform and regula-
tion viable.
In the midst of McCain's step by step approach, however, The Pro-
fessional Boxing Corporation Act of 1997147 was introduced in the
House in mid-July. It retains the major tenets of the previous PBC Acts
of 1992, and 1993, and will probably meet a similar fate. It has been
referred to the Committees on Commerce, and Education and the
Workforce,' 48 where it will most likely remain given the passage of the
Act, and the failure of earlier PBC proposals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Due to the fact that congressional action in the regulation of boxing
has been so long in coming, commentators had for years advanced sev-
eral theories as to why no federal proposals ever became law. It has
been suggested that boxing, compared to the more pressing social, polit-
ical, and economic issues that Congress has had to address, was really
just a low priority. 4 9 Also, the lack of cooperation from those in the
industry itself "strongly suggests that the handful of well-to-do promot-
144. Manny Topol, A Safer Sport of Boxing, NEWVSDAY, July 1, 1997, at A57.
145. See McCain Seeking Pension Plan For Pro Boxers, ARz. REPUBLIC, May 23, 1997, at
C2.
146. Senator Proposes Boxing Pension Plan, LAS VEGAS RBVIEw-JoURNAL, May 23,
1997, at 5C.
147. See H. R. 2176, 105th Cong. (1997).
148. See 105 Bill Tracking H. R. 2176, last action date was July 16, 1997.
149. See Millspaugh, supra note 3, at 67.
[Vol. 9:191
THE PUNCH THAT LANDED
ers and their financial backers that dominate the business today prefer
the . . . system of disorganized and largely ineffectual state regula-
tion."'150 Furthermore, Congress, as well as others, have had a hard time
even identifying a group or organization that acts as the voice for the
profession.' 5' Who then speaks with authority when problems in the
sport are raised?
This lack of centralized organization does not mean that there are
not interested parties in existence. In fact, the opposite is true, which
may be another reason why federal regulation of boxing has been so
delayed. As has previously been recognized, "there are the pressures
exerted by groups which would be adversely affected by any regulatory
process, no matter how minimal the regulation. These groups include
the worldwide sanctioning bodies, the television networks, and the indi-
vidual boxing promoters and managers."' z
Perhaps the largest fear has been that if Congress were to begin fed-
eral regulation of boxing, the whole organization of athletics as we know
them may run amok and fall under government control. Indeed,
"[m]any legislators worry that boxing would be the first step in a regula-
tory scheme that could ultimately include all amateur and professional
sports. Therefore, some legislators do not support boxing reform no
matter how minimal the standards or laudable the goals."' 53
Finally, previous hesitancy on the part of Congress to enact boxing
regulations or reform may have existed because of the misconception
that someone-the states themselves-were already doing something.
However, even those states with the most stringent and comprehensive
plans have been hampered by a lack of federal oversight. The case of
New Jersey is an illustrative example.
Without minimum uniform national standards for boxing regula-
tion, New Jersey's efforts to regulate boxing will be somewhat in-
effective since the state can only keep track of boxers, managers,
etc., when they are operating in the state. Once boxers or other
regulated individuals leave the state, their activities are difficult to
monitor. Regulated individuals are responsible for self-reporting
their activities creating an inherently unreliable system. Any of
the proposed federal legislation would help solve this problem.
New Jersey can now only track the boxers and their fight records
for boxing cards held within its boundaries and must rely on the
150. Id. at 68.
151. See Laufer, supra note 1, at 265.
152. Bershad & Ensor, supra note 3, at 914.
153. Id.
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hearsay of the boxer to report results from outside the state.
With a national clearinghouse for fight data, New Jersey would be
able to update its records using federal data and would be able to
detect any inaccuracies in records submitted by the boxer. 54
Thus, even those states that opted for thorough oversight of the sport
within their jurisdiction were essentially unable to offer full protections
and reliable regulation because they were unable to effectively monitor
boxing elsewhere. The passage of the Act has changed that system
somewhat, opening the lines of communication between the states, and
offering minimal protections for boxers.
With the substantial accusations against the sport, and the numerous
failed attempts toward regulation, what propelled Congress to consider,
and eventually enact the law in 1996? That is a very difficult query to
answer, but worthy of speculation nonetheless.
First, most of the previous proposals, especially those drafted during
the 1990s, were very heavy handed-laden with bureaucratic commis-
sions requiring funding, staffing, and substantial reorganization of the
status quo.155 They were, perhaps, typical overreactions; acknowledging
the problems in boxing, and trying to correct them in one fell swoop,
believing results could only be accomplished through intensive congres-
sional intervention. Such a response may have been overbroad, and too
strong a reaction to gain much support. As previously mentioned, the
Act is rather simplistic, and really only mandates a few minimal require-
ments to be imposed within the current system of regulation by the
states. Thus, the emphasis of the Act in addressing boxing's ills little by
little, may have made it more palatable. Also, shifts in congressional
seats, and philosophical and political biases may have changed the milieu
enough to garner support and prioritize boxing regulation. As one au-
thor noted two years prior the Act's passage,
[i]n lieu of one-stroke perfection, for example, today's Congress
could well be receptive to more limited and incremental measures
carefully designed to selectively improve the industry in certain
key areas of public interest over time. Instead of placing yet an-
other private sector industry under the thumb of another new
154. Id. at 912-13.
155. An exception would be the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994. The author at-
tempted on several occasions to contact Senator John McCain in order to gain insight into the
differences between how the 1994 proposal, and the 1996 Act were received , and the circum-
stances that contributed to the failure of the first, and the eventual passage of the latter. At
the time of publication, no response had been received.
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traditional federal regulatory authority, there may be more recep-
tivity in Congress to alternative arrangements. 56
Second, the near death experience of Gerald McClellan during a
highly publicized bout in London in 1995 may have propelled Congress
toward some type of reform. The McClellan incident seemed to renew
the public debate about the dangers of boxing.'57 Following the McClel-
lan bout, the British Medical Association reasserted its suggestion that
boxing be banned.' Years before, in 1982, the American Medical As-
sociation "recommended rigid safety regulations to better protect boxers
[and] [b]y 1984, the AMA called for an end to all boxing."' 5 9 Thus per-
haps there was a sentiment that if Congress failed to make even meager
strides at boxing reform, public outcry would seek abolition. 6
Whatever the reason, be it timing, response to public concern, con-
gressional climate, or a combination of these and perhaps other factors,
the Act's adoption is of tremendous significance, if only for the fact that
it succeeded where others had failed-by actually moving from proposal
to passage. While it may be inappropriate to gauge its effectiveness at
this juncture due to its newness and the fact that it arguably does not
mandate much, it does provide the groundwork for future reform. And
while one group of critics has now been silenced, the group that asked
"Why isn't Congress doing anything?," new commentators can emerge
to debate whether Congress has gone too far, or not yet far enough.
APRIL R. ANDERSON
156. Millspaugh, supra note 3, at 70-71.
157. See, e.g., Richard Hoffer, Enough? A Brutal Title Bout Left Gerald McClellan Fight-
ing For His Life And The Sport of Boxing Under Attack Once More, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
March 6, 1995, at 25; Rosen, supra note 3.
158. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 611.
159. Walsh, supra note 3, at 68.
160. The McClellan incident was not the first to raise the question of abolition. After the
1963 death of Davey Moore, California Governor Pat Brown, as well as the Pope, publicly
demanded that boxing be outlawed. See Laufer, supra note 1, at 292, n. 188.
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